ossetia war wrap-up
Most of the dust has finally settled from the Russo-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia this summer. Wikipedia has a solid article if you want the play-by-play, but here’s a wrap-up and some recent events.
Russian forces, after dragging their feet for some time, have withdrawn from their buffer zones into South Ossetia and Abkhazia proper. They’re digging in there, having recognized them as independent states, and Georgia has effectively lost them for good. Almost no one else has recognized their independence yet, but as Russian puppets, “independence” is probably a strong word anyway. Even if they’re never officially annexed to the Russian Federation, they are basically Russian territory.
Russia defies U.S. on new Abkhaz, S. Ossetia bases
Abkhazia pledges to continue reinforcing border with Georgia
South Ossetians take control of disputed Georgian village: Tbilisi
(That last one isn’t as aggressive as it sounds- they took it over from Russian troops who had been holding it, not from Georgians.)
So who started it? The western press mostly made the Russians out to be the bad guys, but couldn’t hide the fact that Georgia had gone on the offensive first, making a bold move to seize Tshkinvali, the Ossetian capital, before anyone could stop them. There were lots of provocations on both sides before that, however, and so Georgia claimed to be acting in self-defense.
Here’s the basic argument that the Russians started it, from back in August:
The Truth About Russia in Georgia
OSCE observers and others have come to different conclusions. The NY Times headline here is something of an understatement:
Georgia Claims on Russia War Called Into Question
President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia has characterized the attack as a precise and defensive act. But according to observations of the monitors, documented Aug. 7 and Aug. 8, Georgian artillery rounds and rockets were falling throughout the city at intervals of 15 to 20 seconds between explosions, and within the first hour of the bombardment at least 48 rounds landed in a civilian area. The monitors have also said they were unable to verify that ethnic Georgian villages were under heavy bombardment that evening, calling to question one of Mr. Saakashvili’s main justifications for the attack.
Even the US government, a strong backer of Georgia, now has to say that Georgia got it wrong- short of laying blame, but definitely putting some distance between them:
US Says Georgia Erred in August Attack in South Ossetia
Wherever you stand on blame, it’s hard to disagree that Georgia screwed up. Even with US training and eqipment, their military wasn’t up to the task. They must have been gambling that the Russians wouldn’t want to be seen going to war during the Olympics, but they’d had plenty of clear warnings that Russia would step in. And they managed to strike right after veteran Russian troops had staged wargames near the border, placing them just hours away from the front lines.
Some people will say that the Russians provoked Georgia into attacking. This may be true, or perhaps the South Ossetians did, knowing that Russia would have to step in. Either way, Georgia was stupid to take the bait.
So after such a colossal fail, will Saakashvili’s government survive?
GEORGIAN OPPOSITION DEMANDS FRESH ELECTIONS OR ELSE
Georgia’s Saakashvili weathering storm
So finally, what new questions does the situation raise? I’ve given a fair amount of coverage to some of them, such as what a newly aggressive Russia means to other former Soviet republics or clients, and the effect on oil and gas pipelines through the region. But here’s a few more things to think about.
- Military transformation: The US military has been struggling for years, with limited success, to switch from preparing to face the Red Army in Europe to preparing for smaller asymmetrical conflicts around the world. Suddenly, here’s a war that’s won by the massing of Russian armor. What does this say about our already muddled military priorities? Could we have defended Georgia on short notice if we chose to get involved? It’s not just a question of where we’d find the troops, but of whether current doctrine and equipment would have been effective.
- The Black Sea: The war itself saw the first naval conflict on the Black Sea since WWII, and the post-war period saw US and Russian fleets staring each other down. The limits of the Montreaux Convention, which controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, became apparent when NATO vessels were bottlenecked in delivering aid to Georgia. Access is governed by Turkey, a NATO member. Would the treaty stand if NATO wanted quick access to the Black Sea, where the Russian fleet is based?
- NATO expansion: We’d already made lots of promises to Georgia about NATO membership, which are now being reconsidered. What would have happened if Georgia was already a member? NATO’s eastern expansion proceeded for a time at reckless speed. Lots of NATO members are having second thoughts about that now.
We can expect the fallout from this war to continue for a long time. In combination with Kosovo, it is directly relevant to a number of post-imperial conflicts around Europe. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is now coming unfrozen, as is the conflict between Moldova and separatist Transnistria. The war set off political instability in Ukraine, and Russia is now flexing its mucle in the Baltic region as well. And lots of issues remain unsettled in Georgia itself, including the fate of refugeees and the future of the Georgian government.
It’s easy to forget, in the wake of the economic disasters of the last couple of months, but the Ossetia war probably did more to reshape the international order than anything since maybe the first Gulf War. There’s no saying what the new shape will be, but there’s no going back either.
